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Recent Decisions
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
SECTION

2

022(c)

-

JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER

7 U.S.C.

INCLUDES REVIEW OF SANCTION IMPOSED EVEN

WHEN VIOLATION Is ADMITTED

-

Cross v. United States.'

Plaintiff, James Cross, is the owner of a retail grocery store which,
since 1968, has been authorized to participate in the federal food stamp
program. 2 Two of the requirements of this program are that food stamps
be accepted only for eligible food items3 and that no money be given in
exchange for stamps in excess of forty-nine cents change. 4 Between 1968
and 1969 plaintiff was twice warned that violation of these provisions could
result in his disqualification from the program.
Because of two admitted violations in 1969 and an abnormally high
redemption volume, Department of Agriculture agents made five investigatory shoppings at plaintiff's store in 1971. On each occasion, a clerk in
plaintiff's employ violated one or both of these provisions. As a result of
these violations, the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) officer recommended that plaintiff be disqualified from participation in the program for
ninety days.5 The Regional Office concurred, but the Acting Director of
the Food Stamp Division in Washington increased the disqualification
period to one year.6
Upon review by the Food Stamp Officer 7 the one year disqualification
was affirmed. Cross then sought judicial review of the administrative action
under 7 U.S.C. § 2022.8 Cross did not deny that violations had in fact
taken place; rather he sought a de novo review of the period of disqualifi1. Cross v. United States, 512 F.2d 1212 (4th Cir. 1975).
2. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-26 (1970).
3. 7 C.F.R. § 272.2(b) (1974).

4.
5.
6.
7.

7 C.F.R. § 272.2(e) (1974), as cited in 512 F2d at 1215.
512 F.2d at 1215.
Id.
7 C.F.R. §§ 273.1-.10 (1974). The Food Stamp Review Officer provides

administrative review of sanctions imposed by the FNS.
8. Section 2022(c) states that:
If the store or concern feels aggrieved by such final determination [by the
Administrative Action] he may obtain judicial review thereof by filing a complaint against the United States in the United States district court for the district in which he resides or is engaged in business, or in any court of record of
the State having competent jurisdiction, within thirty days after the date of
delivery or service of the final notice of determination upon him, requesting the
court to set aside such determination. . . . The suit in the United States district

court or State court shall be a trial de novo by the court in which the court shall
determine the validity of the questioned administrative action in issue. If the
court determines that such administrative action is invalid it shall enter such
judgment or order as it determines is in accordance with the law and the evidence.
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cation. The district court, on the authority of Welch v. United States,9
held that it had no authority to review the sanction ° where the fact of
violation was admitted and the sanction imposed was within the limits
prescribed by statute." The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc overruled Welch and held, in an opinion
by Judge Widener, that due process requires judicial review of sanction
under the arbitrary and capricious standard even though the penalty
imposed did not exceed that permitted by law and the fact of the violation
12
was admitted.
Rather than reach the constitutional issue, the court could have found
that 7 U.S.C. § 2022 by its own terms gives a right of judicial review of
sanction. Section 2022 provides, inter alia, that judicial review "shall be
a trial de novo by the court in which the court shall determine the validity
of the questioned administrative action in issue." Judge Widener in his
concurring opinion reasoned that "the 'administrative action' must consist
bdth of the finding of a violation and punishment of disqualification....
9. 464 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1972). In Welch the court of appeals held that under

the Food Stamp Act of 1964, a district court may not reduce an administratively
imposed sanction for admitted violations of the Act when the sanction so imposed is
within the allowable range of the statute and implementing regilations. Thus, the
district court may not go beyond the issue of the validity of the disqualification
action and modify the period of administrative sanction.
10. Review of sanction means a review of the severity of the penalty imposed in
light of the facts of the particular case and the sanctions imposed in similar circumstances. However, a sanction is not rendered invalid merely "because it is more
severe than sanctions imposed in other cases." The sanction must be so "unwarranted in law" or "without justification in fact" so as to be "arbitrary and capricious"
before it will be declared invalid by a reviewing court. 512 F2d at 1226 (Russell, J.,
dissenting).
11. The district court case is unreported.
12. 512 F.2d at 1216, 1218. When the fact of violation is also at issue it is
agreed that the court is empowered to review the sanction and, if necessary, to
substitute its own penalty. See J. L. Saunders, Inc. v. United States, 52 F.D.R. 570
(E.D. Va. 1971).
13. 512 F2d at 1219. Although Judge Widener merely asserts that administrative action includes sanction, there is some statutory language in the Administrative Procedure Act in support of this position. Section 701(b)(2) of 5
U.S.C. states: "'[Algency action' [has] the [meaning] given ... by section 551 of this
title." Section 551(13) of 5 U.S.C. provides: "'agency action' includes the whole
or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial
thereof, or failure to act" (emphasis added). Therefore, under the Administrative
Procedure Act, "agency action" includes the sanction imposed by that agency. One
could make the argument that since the language used in 7 U.S.C. § 2022 (administrative action) is similar to the language used in 5 U.S.C. § 701 (agency action) it
should be construed in a similar manner (i.e., to include sanction). This analysis
fails, however, to take into account the purpose of judicial review under section 2022.
Although the legislative history of section 2022 is rather ambiguous, 512 F2d
at 1216 n.3, one could argue that Congress intended that retailers have the
protection of judicial review when the fact of violation is at issue, but recognized that
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He therefore concluded that section 2022 by its own terms provides for
de novo review of sanction. 4
Judge Field, in a dissenting opinion concurred in by Judge Russell, 15
concluded that the "administrative action" does not include the sanction
imposed. Judge Field adhered to his opinion in Welch in which he stated
that "the action which is subject to judicial scrutiny is the action of disqualification. Section 11 [7 U.S.C. section 2020] of the Act specifically
states that '[t] he action of disqualification shall be subject to review ....
"1s
The majority based its holding upon due process grounds and did not
make a clear determination of whether section 2022 by itself can be construed to give judicial review of sanction. The majority recognized that the
"trial de novo" provided for in section 2022 is limited to a determination of
the "validity" of the questioned administrative action in issue. 17 They then
stated: "To be 'valid,' a sanction must not be arbitrary and capricious
.... ""8 This analysis may indicate an acceptance of the concurring opinion's
choice of sanction is "peculiarly a matter for administrative competence." Butz v.
Glover Livestock Commission Co., Inc., 411 U.S. 182, 185 (1973), quoting from
American Power v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 112 (1946), and did not intend for judicial
review of sanction when the fact of violation is admitted.
14. If section 2022 does provide for judicial review of sanction, there still remains
a question as to the scope of this review. Judge Widener based his concurring opinion
on the broad scope of review usually attributed to the term "trial de novo." He would
allow the reviewing court to "make its own independent judgment as to the term of
disqualification within the limits expressed in 7 C.F.R. § 272.6 ....
." 512 F.2d
at 1221. If such review is really "de novo" it is not clear why Judge Widener
limits the sanction the district court may impose since the regulations are in no way
binding upon the court.
Although section 2022 provides for a trial de novo to determine the "validity"
of the administrative action, the statute gives no express guidance for determining
whether or not an action is valid. Thus, if "administrative action" includes both a
determination of the fact of violation and the sanction imposed, then two entirely
different tests might be applied to determine when each is valid. This, in effect, is
the conclusion the Cross majority reached. If the fact of violation is at issue, the
Cross majority would allow for a full trial de novo. 512 F.2d at 1216 n.4. If,
however, the fact of violation is admitted, the sanction imposed must only be neither
"arbitrary nor capricious" to be valid. Id. at 1218.
15. For a discussion of Judge Russell's dissenting opinion, see text accompanying notes 40-47 infra.
16. 464 F.2d at 684. Section 2020 provides further that a food store or concern
"may be disqualified from further participation in the food stamp program
on a
finding . . . that such store or concern has violated any of the provisions of this
chapter .... ." This seems to imply that the "disqualification" rests merely on a
finding of violation, and is distinct from the sanction imposed.
Section 2020 then states that "[s]uch disqualification shall be for such period
of time as may be determined in accordance with [the] regulations .... ." This,
however, might indicate that the disqualification necessarily includes a sanction. Therefore section 2020 is by no means conclusive on the issue of whether "administrative
action" includes sanction.
17. 512 F.2d at 1216 n.4 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 1218.
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proposition that "administrative action" includes sanction, and therefore
section 2022 by its own terms provides for judicial review of sanction.' 9
The majority in Cross, however, stated that "due process requires that
section 2022 be construed to give the district court a measure of revisory
power over the sanction if it determines that the fact of violation has been
proved. '20 The court said that the sanction constitutes a deprivation of
property and that "the Constitution requires that due process be afforded
before that deprivation becomes effective."' 21 The opinion then examined
the administrative enforcement scheme2 2 and concluded that the usual
attributes of notice and hearing were not present. 23 The majority, citing
Crowell v. Benson,24 stated that if full procedural due process is not provided at the administrative levels it must be provided on appeal to preserve
the regulatory scheme from constitutional attack. 25 They therefore found
judicial review under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard to be constitutionally compelled.2 6 If, however, as the majority seems to suggest
in its "validity" argument,27 section 2022 itself provides for judicial re19. It might be argued that implicit in the majority's due process holding is a
finding that the statute does not, on its face, provide for judicial review of sanction
when the fact of violation is admitted. However, the majority may have based
its
holding upon due process rather than straight statutory "construction merely because
it felt itself on firmer ground. This violates the principle that courts should decide
constitutional questions only if the statutory language, leaves no reasonable alternative. 512 F.2d at 1219 (Widener, J., concurring) and cases cited therein.
20. Id. at 1216 (emphasis added).

21. Id. at 1217.
22. The Act vests in the Secretary the rule-making authority to devise a scheme
of enforcement, 7 U.S.C. § 2013(c) (1970). The scheme provides for disqualification
from participation for not more than three years if the FNS finds violation of the
Act or regulations. Disqualification is based upon information gathered by FNS,
except that the retailer is given notice of the charges against him, and afforded an
opportunity to give an explanation for noncompliance. 7 C.F.R. § 272.6(b) (1974).
Any such explanation is reviewed by the Director, Food Stamp Division, who shall
then issue his determination. 7 C.F.R. § 27 2 .6(c) (1974). Once the Director makes
his determination, the retailer may have this determination reviewed by a Food Stamp
Officer. 7 C.F.R. § 273.3-273.5 (1974). The retailer 'may supply the Officer with
information in support of his position. 7 C.F.R. § 273.7 (1974). The Food Stamp
Review Officer may review, reverse, or modify the Director's determination. 7 C.F.R.
§ 273.8 (1974).

23. 512 F.2d at 1217.
24. 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).
25. 512 F.2d at 1217. Judge Russell in his dissnt points out: (1) that Crowell

has been severely criticized and may no longer be considered good law, Id. at 1222
n.4, and, (2) that in any event the plaintiff, by admitting his violation, has waived
his due process rights, if any such rights do, in fact, :exist on the administrative
level. Id.
26. The court found the "arbitrary and capricious". standard to be derived from
the Administrative Procedure Act [5 U.S.C.. § 706(2) (A)], the Welch concurrence,
and the Shurkin (unreported) majority. Id.'at 1218.
27. See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
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view of sanction, then there is no need to resort to due process to provide
a basis for such review.
Interestingly, the opinions do not discuss the applicability of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 28 Section 706(2) of the APA
provides that "agency action must be set aside if the action was 'arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law' or if the action failed to meet statutory, procedural, or constitutional
requirements." 29 The general review standards of the APA apply "except
to the extent that (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law."' 30 If administrative
action is limited to the action of disqualification and does not include sanction, 31 then section 2022 is silent as to judicial review of sanction. There is
no presumption against judicial review and in favor of administrative
absolutism, and only upon a showing of a contrary legislative intent by
"clear and convincing evidence" will the courts restrict access to judicial
review.3 2 Therefore, since judicial review of sanction alone is not specifically excluded by section 2022, such review should exist under the provisions of the A.P.A.33 Judicial review of the action of disqualification if
the violations are denied would be de novo under section 706(2) (F)
which provides that "[t]he reviewing court shall(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts
are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court."
Thus section 2022 grants "'a trial de novo well beyond the scope of review
under the general provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act ....

,',,

A further problem with the majority's opinion is its application of
the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. Citing Buts v. Glover
Livestock Commission Co.,35 the majority acknowledged that the scope
of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review extends to whether
28. The concurrence noted that the result it reached would be the same under
the APA but did not discuss whether or not the Act did, in fact, apply. 512 F.2d at
1221 n.3.
29. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971).
30. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970).
31. See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
32. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971);
Barlow v. Collins, 396 U.S. 159, 167 (1970); Association of Data Processing Service,
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970). But see K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIW LAW TEXT § 28.03 (1972). See also id. § 29.01.
33. This interpretation recognizes that choice of sanction is peculiarly a matter
for administrative competence while still allowing for some measure of judicial review
under a well defined statutory standard.
34. 512 F.2d at 1216, citing Peoples v. United States Dep't of Agric., 427 F.2d
561, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (citations omitted).
35. 411 U.S. 182 (1972).
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the action is "unwarranted in law" or "without justification in fact."3 On
the facts before it, the majority declined to affirm the district court's summary judgment enforcing the sanction, but instead remanded the case to
permit the review to be afforded.37 There are two possible reasons for the
court's decision to remand. The court of appeals may have remanded the
case simply because the district court felt that it was without authority
to review the sanction once the fact of violation was admitted. 38 If this
is the case, the decision to remand would indicate nothing as to the majority's conception of the scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious
standard.
However, the majority in Crdss also stated that, "In the instant case,
there may be room to question the validity of the sanction. . . -39

Thus,

it might have remanded the case because it believed the Secretary's
action was possibly "arbitrary and capricious." If so, then, as Judge
Russell points out in his dissent, 40 there are strong grounds upon which to
criticize the majority's application of this standard. Dicta in Supreme
Court cases 4 ' support the majority's position that review under the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard extends beyond determining
whether
the sanction was within statutory limits. But in light of the holdings, 42
36. 512 F.2d at 1218.
37. Id. at 1219.
38. "Since, in the instant case, the district court understandably thought that it
lacked power to review the period of disqualification, we vacate its judgment and
remand the case to permit the review to be afforded." Id.
39. Id. at 1218. See id., at n.ll.
40. Id. at 1226.
41. Butz v. Glover Livestock Commission Co., 411 U.S. 182 (1972); FTC
v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244 (1967); Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355
U.S. 411 (1958); American Power Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946); Jacob Siegel
Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
42. In Butz v. Glover Livestock Commission Co., Inc., 411 U.S. 182 (1973),
respondent was ordered by a Judicial Officer acting for the Secretary of Agriculture
to cease and desist from using false weights. Its registration under the Packers and
Stockyards Act was suspended for twenty days. The Court held that the suspension
was not so without justification in fact as to constitute an abuse of discretion and the
sanction was therefore upheld. Id. at 188-89. FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387
U.S. 244 (1967), involved an FTC cease and desist order prohibiting respondent
from discriminating in price between competing customers.

Respondent petitioned

the FTC to stay the order pending industry-wide investigation but the FTC denied
the petition. The Court held that the FTC's refusal did not constitute a patent
abuse of discretion and refused to overturn it. Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355

U.S. 411 (1958), also involved an FTC cease and desist order preventing illegal price
discrimination. The Court again held that the FTC's order and refusal to stay was
not a "patent abuse of discretion," and refused to overturn it. Id. at 414. In Barsky
v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954), the Board of Regents of New York
suspended appellant's license to practice medicine for six months as a result of his

failure to produce subpoenaed papers before a Congressional Committee. The Court
held the six month's suspension not "an arbitrary or capricious decision . . . " Id.

at 455. American Power Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946), involved an SEC dissolution order pursuant to section 11 (b) (2) of the Public Utilities Holding Company Act.

180
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it would be an extravagant application of that standard if it were found to
43
be violated here.
While the majority's application of the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard seems too broad, Judge Russell's interpretation seems unduly
restrictive. Judge Russell would review the sanction only to see if the
penalty imposed was within the statutory limits. 44 If so, then "any attempt
*

.

. to invalidate such a sanction would be 'an impermissible intrusion into

the administrative domain.' "4 Judge Russell's interpretation of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard would render the Court's language "without justification in fact" superfluous since he would find every sanction
"warranted in law" (i.e. within the limits imposed by statute) not to be
arbitrary or capricious. Further, the APA review provision, 5 U.S.C.
The Court held that the Commission's choice of dissolution was not so lacking in
reasonableness as to constitute an abuse of discretion. In Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC,
327 U.S. 608 (1946), the Court affirmed the Commission's cease and desist order
based on a finding that petitioner's trade name was deceptive. Once again, the Court
found that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in issuing the order. Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941), involved an NLRB order requiring
petitioner to reinstate certain strikers. The Court affirmed the authority of the Board
to issue such an order but required that the Board state the basis for the order
thereby giving a "clear indication that it has exercised the discretion with which
Congress has empowered it." Id. at 197.
43. Judge Russell, arguing that the "arbitrary and capricious" standard was not
violated here, summarized the facts as follows:
The record shows that the plaintiff had been involved in violations of the Act on
two occasions prior to those that prompted this proceeding. In both instances he
was warned; the regulations were reviewed with him. In at least one of the
instances ineligible items had been exchanged for food coupons. The plaintiff
offered as an excuse in one case that a clerk had acted against instructions. In
connection with that violation plaintiff was cautioned about his responsibility for
his clerks. On the occasions when the five purchases were made that gave rise
to the disqualification, the plaintiff again sought to excuse his offenses by claiming that they were the fault of a clerk who was an alcoholic. These five purchases, however, were spread over three days. There is no claim that the clerk
was under the influence on any one of these days. The ineligible items sold for
food stamps were items easily identifiable as ineligible .

. .

. In fact, every pur-

chase made included ineligible items and almost half of the items purchased were
ineligible items. Cash in varying amounts was given in change in the case of
four of the purchases. On the basis of this record the Secretary concluded that
the plaintiff "as a matter of store policy" was engaged in selling ineligible items
for coupons.
512 F.2d at 1226 (footnote omitted).
44. Judge Russell does not expressly adopt the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. He states, in fact, that "[t]here is no language in § 2022 to support
that standard of review." Id. at 1223. However, his dissent appears to be more
concerned with the majority's application of that standard than with its adoption. Id.
at 1226.
45. Id. at 1226, citing Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182
(1973). Judge Russell recognizes there is dictum in Butz contrary to his position.
However, he submits that the holding, and not the dictum, is really controlling.
512 F2d at 1224 n.15.
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§ 706 provides, inter alia, that "[t] he reviewing court shall hold unlawful
and set aside agency action . . . found to be - (A) arbitrary, capricious,
. .. ; (C) in excess of statutory . . .authority." Thus, "unless the Act's

drafters committed a redundancy, the 'arbitrary, capricious' standard goes
beyond" a determination that the agency sanction conforms to the agency's
delegated power. 46 As the Supreme Court pointed out in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, "scrutiny of the facts does not end,
however, with the determination that the Secretary has acted within the
scope of his statutory authority. Section 706(2) (A) requires a finding
that the actual choice made was not 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.' 47 If the majority
in Cross did remand because it found the Secretary's sanction to be "arbitrary and capricious" then the true scope of this standard of review is
probably somewhere in between that envisioned by the majority and that
envisioned by Judge Russell in his dissent.
The Crdss majority unnecessarily based its holding upon constitutional
grounds rather than on the statute itself or application of the Administrative Procedure Act. 48 If the term "administrative action" includes sanction, then section 2022 itself provides for de novo review of sanction when
the fact of violation is admitted. 49 If "administrative action" does not include sanction, then section 2022 is silent regarding judicial review of sanction and the general review provisions [5 U.S.C. § 706(2)] of the APA
should apply.
The Cross majority's constitutional basis for adopting an "arbitrary
and capricious" standard for review of sanction as well as its application
of that standard, is questionable. Further, the court's holding places the
fourth circuit "at odds with every other federal court that has had occasion
to consider this question," 50 and therefore "will give violators of the Act
in this Circuit a right of judicial review of sanctions . . . not enjoyed by

violators in any other circuit where the issue has been considered."
In light of this, perhaps the Supreme Court should settle the issue.

51

46. J.Skelly Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of
Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. Rv. 375, 390 (1974).
47. 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
48. See text accompanying notes 21-27 supra.
49. As previously noted, there remains a question as to the scope of such review.
See note 14 supra.
50. 512 F.2d at 1221. Judge Field citing: Martin v. United States, 459
F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1972); Save More of Gary, Inc. v. United States, 442
F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1971); Marcus v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, Food &
Nut. Serv., 364 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Eckstut v. Hardin, 363 F. Supp. 701
(E.D. Pa. 1973); Miller v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, Food & Nut.
Serv., 345 F. Supp. 1131 (W.D. Pa. 1972) ; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. United
States, 342 F. Supp. 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Farmingdale Supermarket, Inc. v. United
States, 336 F. Supp. 534 (D.N.J. 1971); and Marbro Foods, Inc. v. Unted States,
293 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
51. 512 F2d at 1227 (Russell, J., dissenting).
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Garner v. Uniited States.'

Roy D. Garner reported on his federal income tax returns for 1965,
1966 and 1967 that his principal occupation was gambling.2 In a subsequent
jury trial, Garner was convicted of conspiring to violate various federal
gambling laws.8 His tax returns were admitted in evidence over his objection that it violated his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.4 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether
incriminating admissions made in an income tax return might later be used
by the government in a non-tax-related prosecution, or whether the defendant might have them excluded by raising his fifth amendment privilege. A divided three judge panel reversed the conviction, 5 recognizing
the defendant's right to assert the privilege at trial; a motion for rehearing
was denied. Almost two years later, however, another motion for rehearing
was granted, and the court heard reargument en banc. The result was
a seven to five decision affirming the conviction, holding that it was too
late to raise the privilege at trial, and stating that the proper time to assert
it would have been at the time of filing the return.6 Garner's petition to
the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari was granted,7 and it is probable
that the Court will address the issue for the first time during the October
Term, 1975.
, The majority of the court en banc traced briefly the background of
the privilege. They noted that the fifth amendment may well have been
intended originally to provide a mere right to a defendant in a criminal
case not to testify against himself,8 but that it has now become a privilege
available to a witness in any proceeding, "wherever the answer might tend
to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it." The court theorized
1. 501 F2d 228 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 923 (1975).
2. 501 F.2d at 237.
3. Id. at 237 n.2. The statutes involved were: 18 U.S.C. § 224 (1970) (bribery
in sporting contests) ; 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1970) (interstate transmission of wagering
information by one in the business of betting or wagering) ; 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970)
(use of interstate facility to distribute proceeds of unlawful activities).
4. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself ....
" U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. 501 F.2d at 230 (panel decision). The panel opinions, written in 1972, are
reported with the en banc opinions cited in note 1 supra.
6. 501 F.2d at 240 (en banc).
7. 420 U.S. 923 (1975).
8. 501 F.2d at 237, citing Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 76 (1968)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
9. 501 F.2d at 237 n.8, citing McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924)
(holding privilege applicable to bankruptcy proceedings). Examples of situations in
which one may raise the privilege include Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
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that the scope of the privilege differs depending on whether it is raised by a
criminal defendant in his own case, or by a witness in some other proceeding: a defendant is entitled not to be subjected at all to questioning on the
stand while a non-defendant witness cannot object to questions being asked,
his only recourse being to refuse to answer on the grounds of possible selfincrimination.1 ° In classifying Garner as a witness, the court relied on
dictum in United States v. Sullivan," for the principle that Garner could
have refused to answer particular questions on his tax return.12 Thus, like
a witness in a civil proceeding, he could not object to being asked questions
the answers to which might incriminate him, but he could refuse to give
the incriminating answers. Having thus found Garner to be more like a
witness than a defendant, the court concluded that since Garner failed to
assert the privilege at the time the question was asked, he could not later
assert it at trial.' 3 To support this conclusion the court hypothesized that
if Garner had observed an automobile accident in the parking lot of a
race track and had been subpoenaed to testify and had been asked whether
he was present at the track on the day in question, and if he had reason
to believe his affirmative response might be used against him in a prosecution
for some crime he had committed at the track that day, Garner could
refuse to answer the question. But if he did answer, admitting his presence,
he would not be able to suppress the evidence at a later trial. 1 4 By analogy,
then, the court found Garner to have forfeited his right not to admit to
being a gambler when he filed his tax return listing gambling as his main
source of income.
The court then dealt with a recent line of Supreme Court cases 15 which
indicated that, at least in some areas of government regulation, there is a
(custodial interrogation); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964)

(administrative proceedings); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) (legislative proceedings); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (attorney discipline proceedings); United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943) (grand jury); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (proceeding to condemn imported goods).
10. 501 F.2d at 238. See C. MCCoRMicK, EVIDENCE §§ 130, 136 (2d ed. 1972).
11. 274 U.S. 259 (1927) (Holmes, 3.).
12. See p. 187 infra.
13. 501 F.2d at 238-39.
14. Id. Strangely, the court asserts this conclusion without citation to any
authority. While it may be assumed to be too obvious a point to bother supporting,
see J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2276 (McNaughton rev. 1961), there appears to be no
express Supreme Court holding on the issue. Cf. Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S.
7 (1918) (evidence offered by party to civil action in support of his own case held
admissible in subsequent criminal prosecution). See generally C. McCoRMiICK,
EVIDENCE §§ 13641 (2d ed. 1972).
15. The cases were: Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Haynes v.
United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968);
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70
(1965). Leary held the fifth amendment to bar a prosecution for failure to pay a
transfer tax on illegal drugs; Haynes held the fifth amendment barred a prosecution
for failure to register an illegal weapon; and Grosso and Marchetti held the fifth
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right to refuse to respond at all to government questioning. The leading
case, Albertson v. SACB, 16 involved an administrative order to Communist
Party members to register in accordance with the Subversive Activities
Control Act. The members refused on the ground of their fifth amendment
privilege, claiming that to do so would subject them to criminal liability.
The Court held that the fifth amendment did in fact allow them to refuse
to register. However, the Court distinguished Sullivan on the grounds
that :
In Sullivan the questions in the income tax return were neutral on
their face and directed at the public at large, but here they are directed
at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities. 7
Because this distinction has been reiterated by the Court on numerous
occasions, the majority concluded that the Sullivan case is still good law.' 8
The majority reasoned further that when the government's purpose in
seeking information is neutral and regulatory only, as in the taxing scheme
involved in Sullivan and Garner,19 there is lacking the prosecutorial element
involved in Albertson. Therefore, a different treatment of incriminating
information obtained through the questions, i.e., prosecutorial use, is justified. In like manner the court distinguished cases like Mirandav. Arizona20
which held that a waiver of the fifth amendment privilege not to answer
questions during a custodial interrogation would not be recognized absent
an affirmative showing by the government of an intelligent and voluntary
decision by the defendant to forego his privilege. The difference between
accusatory questions asked during a custodial interrogation, and neutral
questions asked on a tax form again justifies a different approach to the
2
treatment of incriminating information obtained in the answers. 1
The court also feared that to allow Garner to raise his defense at trial
would be to allow him to grant himself a use immunity without government
supervision." Additionally, the court feared that this ability to immunize
amendment a complete defense to a prosecution for failure to register as a gambler
with the IRS, to pay the occupational tax imposed by the Code, and to pay excise
taxes on wagers. Albertson is discussed in the text accompanying note 16 infra.
16. 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
17. Id. at 79.
18. 501 F.2d 239. See Haynes, 390 U.S. at 98; Grosso, 390 U.S. at 67; Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48-49. The Court's remarks in Haynes on this point are discussed
in the text accompanying notes 32-34 infra.
19. The court also cited Byers v. California, 402 U.S. at 424 (1971), where the
government demanded that automobile drivers stop and identify themselves if involved
in an accident, as an example of a neutral regulatory scheme. For a discussion of the
implications of Byers as applied to the panel decision in Garner see 86 HARV. L. REV.
914 (1973) ; Note, Garner v. United States: Fifth Amendment Protection for the
Taxpayer, 34 U. PITT. L. REV. 510 (1973).
20. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
21. 501 F.2d at 239.
22. Id. at 240. The court, again relying on the analogy to a witness at a trial,
concluded that "he is not free to immunize himself from prosecution by volunteering
information to the government." Id.
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oneself would extend to all areas of government inquiry. "Such a decision,"
the court wrote, "would 'embark us on unchartered [sic] and treacherous
seas.' "2 Finally, the court argued that the " 'privilege is a personai privilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate him.' "24 Therefore, the admission made on the tax return which
was filed with the government was no longer within the scope of the
privilege.
A strong dissent attacked the majority's theoretical foundation, namely
that there is a separate category of persons whose privilege amounts only
to a right to refuse to answer questions on the grounds of possible selfincrimination. It presented an alternative theory, gleaned from Justice
Goldberg's discussion in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,25 to the effect

that the privilege has two facets: the government may not compel selfincrimination, and if it does, it may not use the information thus compelled
in a criminal trial. The dissent reasoned that Garner was compelled to
incriminate himself on the tax return because failure to file a complete
return could have resulted in a prosecution under the Internal Revenue
Code. 26 Relying on the coerced confession cases which have consistently
held an involuntary confession inadmissible, 27 and dictum in Mackey v.
23. Id., quoting from Byers v. California, 402 U.S. 424, 458 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). As the dissent to Garner points out, 501 F.2d at 258, this fear is unfounded. If immunity is granted, it would only be in those cases where the information
was incriminating and required by the Internal Revenue Code. Thus, one could only
raise the privilege as to information which the majority states could be omitted from
the tax return by asserting the privilege at the time of filing. Other incriminating
information supplied gratuitously in hopes of depriving the government of its use
would not be exclusible.
24. 501 F.2d at 240, quoting from Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328
(1973).
25. 378 U.S. 52, 57 n.6 (1964).

26. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7203, makes willful failure to file a return a
punishable offense. See notes 43-46 and accompanying text infra. The dissent contended that what Garner had at the time of filing was not a privilege not to answer,
but a possible constitutional defense to a prosecution under. § 7203 for failure to
answer. Defining "privilege" as "the actual recognition that [one] is free not to
answer," 501 F.2d at 244, they argued that Garner had never had such a privilege
and should not be penalized for failing to "run the risk of an uncertain invocation of
the privilege on his tax return." Id. at 245.
27. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368 (1964) ; Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). Brain was a federal murder
case in which the defendant had made incriminating statements to an investigator.
The case contains a lengthy examination of common law cases, especially in England,
and concludes that the government must establish that the making of the statement
was voluntary. Jackson, a state murder case, held that a voluntariness determination
must be made by the court in an adequate evidentiary hearing. Miranda spelled out
the warnings which must be given to an individual subjected to custodial interrogation
before any statement made by the individual may be used against him.
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United States, 28 the dissent concluded that Garner could assert his privilege
29
at trial.
Excellent policy considerations were marshalled in support of this
theory and the conclusion that the court should grant a use immunity as to
incriminating evidence which a taxpayer is required to report. Since Congress' purpose is to tax all income, any deterrent from reporting all income
should be removed. If a use immunity were granted as to information contained in the return, persons fearing criminal prosecution would 11o longer
be deterred from filing their return. In addition, granting such immunity
would be an easy task, since the Treasury Department is separate from
the Department of Justice, and since there are already procedures in effect
at the Treasury to keep tax returns relatively confidential. 30 Thus, it
would be a simple matter for the government to prove that the 31
prosecutor
had not had access to the information contained in the return.
28. 401 U.S. 667 (1971). Mackey had filed excise tax returns on his wagers,
and his returns were used against him in a prosecution for fraudulent under-reporting
on his income tax return. When the Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment
barred a prosecution for failing to file these returns in Grosso v. United States, 390
U.S. 62 (1968), discussed in note 15 supra, Mackey sought to have his conviction set
aside. While holding that their ruling in Grosso would not be applied retroactively,
the Court conceded that, "It followed [from Grosso] that the registration and
excise tax returns filed in response to the statutory command were inadmissible
in evidence as part of the prosecution's case in chief." 401 U.S. at 672. The dissent
reasoned that if Sullivan is read to allow the taxpayer to assert his privilege on the
return, this amounts to a recognition that the questions on the return "unconstitutionally compelled him to incriminate himself." 501 F.2d at 244. It would follow
from the dictum quoted above that if information is obtained in response to these
questions, that information would be inadmissible in evidence. 501 F.2d at 243-44.
This, of course, begs the question whether in a neutral regulatory scheme, questions
asked by the government are to be treated similarly to questions asked to serve a
prosecutorial purpose. See text accompanying notes 36-39 infra.
29. Finding support for this conclusion in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Byers v. California, 402 U.S. 424, 434 (1971), one writer concluded that the original
panel decision, reversing Garner's conviction, was correct. 86 HARV. L. REv. 914
(1973). Reaching a contrary conclusion on the basis of the same case is Note, Garner
v. United States: Fifth Amendment Protectionfor the Taxpayer, 34 U. PITT. L. REV.
510 (1973). See also Comment, Self-Incrimination: Income Tax: the Fifth Amendment and Statutory Self-Disclosure: Reporting Illegal Gains on Federal Income Tax
Returns, 23 EMORY L.J. 1119 (1974); Comment, Reporting Illegal Gains as Taxable
Income: A Compromise Solution to a Prosecutorial Windfall, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 111
(1974) ; Comment, Garner v. United States: Regulatory and Taxing Schemes, Compelled Disclosures, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 8 GA. L. REv.
160 (1973).
30. See 86 HAxv. L. REV. 914, 921 (1973).

31. The dissent further reasoned that it makes better sense to analyze the government's purpose to see if it is prosecutorial or regulatory at the particular time in question. Thus, when the taxpayer files the return, the government's purpose is purely
regulatory and the taxpayer should not be allowed to withhold any information. When
the evidence is offered at trial, however, the government's purpose is clearly prosecutorial, and the fifth amendment should operate to exclude it. While analytically
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Despite the force of the dissent's reasoning, the majority's conclusion
appears to better conform with the law as expressed by the Supreme Court,
and also to be supported by a careful policy analysis in its own right. The
majority reasoned that Garner's answering a neutral question on his tax
return was more like a witness incriminating himself at a civil trial than a
prisoner subject to custodial interrogation, or a member of a group "inherently suspect of criminal activities" in an "area permeated with criminal
32
statutes." Dictum by the Supreme Court in Haynes v. United States,
not discussed by the Garner opinions, bears this conclusion out. Haynes
was a prosecution under a federal statute which in effect required the defendant to register his illegal weapon, the possession of which was probably
a crime. Holding that the fifth amendment barred a prosecution for failure
to register, the Court stated:
[T]hese statutory provisions, as now written, cannot be brought within
any of the situationsin which the Court has held that the constitutional
privilege does not prevent the use by the United States of information
obtained in connection with regulatory programs of general application.
See United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259; Shapiro v. United States,
335 U.S. 1.33

Sullivan involved the willful failure to file an income tax return. The
defendant raised his fifth amendment privilege on the ground that his
income was mostly illegal and to report it would be to incriminate himself.
The Court rejected this argument, stating that the defendant should have
filed a return, refusing only to answer those questions which if answered
would incriminate. By citing to Sullivan as basic source material for the
above quoted statement in Haynes, the Court indicated that it considered
the income tax laws to be one of the regulatory "situations in which

. . .

the

constitutional privilege does not prevent use by the United States of [the]
information obtained." The dictum thus directly supports the conclusion which the majority attempted to reach by analogizing to a civil
trial: Garner cannot invoke his fifth amendment privilege as to information
4
contained in his tax return.3
desirable, this reasoning is countered by the fact that the Supreme Court has generally
considered the privilege to be personal in nature, and not something that attaches to
the evidence itself. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973).
32. 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
33. Id. at 98 (emphasis added).
34. Despite the language in Haynes quoted above, the Court in Sullivan certainly did not hold that the government could use information obtained on a tax
return in a subsequent prosecution. While this renders the value of the dictum somewhat uncertain as to the area of income tax, the other citation, to Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), is also of interest.
Shapiro involved a prosecution for violation of the Emergency Price Control
Act. Prior to the prosecution, the Price Administrator had subpoenaed various
records which Shapiro had been required by law to maintain for inspection. Over
his fifth amendment objection to their use at trial, the Court held that the required
records had become public documents and could be used against him in a criminal
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As suggested earlier, there is a sound policy foundation for this distinction between obtaining information through neutral questions as opposed
to questions prompted by a prosecutorial purpose.35 One of the basic purposes of the privilege is to keep our system of criminal justice an accusatorial one, not an inquisitional one. Recognizing that the individual is no
match for the power of the state if coercion is allowed, and that it would be
administratively convenient for the state to be able to rely on a defendant's
self-incrimination rather than having to ferret out convincing evidence
without assistance from the accused, the Anglo-American system of criminal justice has historically required the state to bear the burden of proving
guilt.36 It is therefore appropriate to analyze government questioning in
terms of the motive behind it. When it is motivated by a prosecutorial
purpose, special protection is needed by the individual. It is here that
the two facets of the privilege urged by the dissent make sense:37 The
accusatorial system requires that the law forbid the government from
compelling self-incrimination, and it requires that any evidence obtained in
violation of this restriction be excluded. Without this dual protection of
the individual, the government would be encouraged to coerce information
for the purpose of prosecution, in other words, to become an inquisitional
system. Where the government's purpose is neutral, however, as in the
area of income taxation, there is no need for this dual protection; since
the government is not questioning for the purpose of prosecution, there is
no need to discourage it from doing so. Arguments that the government
will be encouraged to create an enormous, computerized inquisition under
the guise of "neutral" regulatory functions 38 miss the point. If in fact
the regulatory system becomes inquisitional, protection will be provided
against it; as long as it remains essentially regulatory, it is sufficient that
the individual be able to refuse to answer at the time of filing his return.3 9
prosecution. This indicates that there are areas of government regulation where individuals may be required by law and under threat of penalty for non-compliance to
provide information, some of which might be of an incriminating nature, and yet,
once it is entered on the records, will not be able to object to its use. This undermines
the dissent's attempt to subsume all areas of compelled disclosure into a single category, and then uniformly apply those concepts which were developed in areas in
which compulsion is motivated by a prosecutorial purpose.
35. This distinction is not universally regarded as a sharp one. Justice Harlan
in his concurring opinion to California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 434 (1971), suggested
that, in order to determine whether a privilege existed with respect to answers to
governmental questioning, the government's prosecutorial purpose should be weighed
against its regulatory purpose and the defendant's interests. Thus, there may be
areas of governmental inquiry where regulation and prosecution are so well balanced
as to make difficult a classification as either neutral or prosecutorial.
36. See J. WIGMORF, EVIDENCE § 2251 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
37. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
38. See 501 F.2d at 248 (dissenting opinion) ; 86 HARV. L. REV. 914 (1973).
39. One consideration not often dealt with in fifth amendment cases is the desirability of strictly construing evidentiary privileges since they are "in derogation of
the search for truth." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). See
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Whatever the Supreme Court decides, there is a real need for a definitive statement of what is the proper course to take for a taxpayer required
to report incriminating information. Sullivan held that one could not refuse
to file a return 40 and the Ninth Circuit in Garner held that if one did
report incriminating information one could not later have it excluded. 41
While dicta in Sullivan and Garner indicate that one can refuse to answer
particular questions on a return, 42 the point is not universally conceded.
When Garner filed his 1973 tax return, having learned his lesson at his
trial, he neatly printed in the box marked "occupation":
REFUSE TO ANSWER
43
5TH AMMENDMENT [sic] PRIVELEGE [sic].

To this the IRS replied:
[Il]t is not acceptable as your income tax return. A taxpayer's return,
which does not contain any information relating to the taxpayer's
income from which the tax can be computed, is not a return within the
meaning of the Internal Revenue Code. . . 44
Possible prosecution was threatened should Garner fail to submit an
"adequate" return. 45 While Garner would certainly be in no danger
of
conviction in the Ninth Circuit, 46 the dilemma does illustrate the need for
a comprehensive statement by the Supreme Court. One should hopefully
be forthcoming next term.
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 18, Garner v. United States, 501 F.2d 228 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 923 (1975). Petitioner argued that the grant
of a use immunity in the instant case would be consistent with this narrow construction.

40. See p. 187 supra.
41. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
42. See text accompanying note 6 & p. 187 supra.
43. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, Supplemental Exhibit B at 1-3. Garner
included a letter explaining that he was under criminal investigation and that the
Attorney General considered him a member of organized crime. He did report the
amount of his income and apparently paid tax on that amount. Id.
44. Id. The language used is borrowed from United States v. Porth, 426 F.2d
519, 523 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
45. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, Supplemental Exhibit C at 4-5.
46. But cf. United States v. Hordan, 508 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Porth, 426 F.2d 519 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). In these
cases convictions were affirmed where the taxpayers had filed returns without listing
any income on the grounds that such information would tend to incriminate them.

